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STATE LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION OF FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: AN OVERVIEW
PhilipL. Martin*
Article V of the United States Constitution sets out the amendment procedure,' which consists of two stages, proposal and ratification. Each stage, in turn, offers two alternative procedures which
can be interchanged to provide four means of effecting constitutional alteration. An amendment may be proposed either by a twothirds vote of each house of Congress or by a national convention
assembled upon proper application by the legislatures of two-thirds
of the states; and an amendment may be ratified, as Congress decides, either by three-fourths of the state legislatures or by conventions in three-fourths of the states. To date, the legislative mode of
ratification has been selected for all but one 2 of the 32 resolutions
submitted to the states, 3 but despite the frequency of its use as
contrasted to the convention method, very little is known about its
origin and evolution. In particular, there are a number of constitutional, as well as practical questions which require definitive answers. For example, the resolution guaranteeing equal rights to
women (ERA) is currently before the states where it has been approved by either 31 or 33 legislatures, depending upon whether ratification can be validly rescinded. To date, Nebraska and Tennessee
have revoked their ratification and several other states are contemplating similar action.
*Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. B.S.,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 1956; M.A., 1959, Ph.D., 1965, University of North Carolina.
1. U.S. CONST. art. V.
2. Only the twenty-first amendment, which repealed prohibition, has been submitted to
state ratifying conventions. This experience and the attempts to use the convention route for
other amendments are examined in Martin, Convention Ratification of Federal Constitutional Amendments, 82 POL. Sci. Q. 61 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Martin].
3. In addition to the 26 amendments added to the Constitution, five other proposals sent
before the states have failed to be ratified. These concerned: apportioning the House of
Representatives (1789); compensating members of Congress (1789); permitting United States
citizens to accept foreign titles of nobility (1810); recognizing slavery where it existed in the
states (1861); and regulating child labor (1924). At present a sixth resolution, the Equal
Rights Amendment for Women (1972), is circulating among the states.
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A matter closely related to the problem of rescinding ratification
is the manner in which a state legislature determines the ratification
or rejection of a proposed federal constitutional amendment. This
decision-making process, which logically controls, or at least influences the result, has not been explored in previous studies., Therefore, this article will examine the historical and theoretical development of the legislative mode of ratification and the mechanics established by the states for processing this extraordinary business in
accordance with rulings of the United States Supreme Court.
I.

THE THEORY OF ARTICLE V

One of the major American contributions to the art and science
of government is the concept of constitutional amendment by a
formal process. It is not surprising that this country should make
such an innovation inasmuch as providing the means for legitimately changing the fundamental law is implicit in the theory of a
written constitution, a tenet which was first fully developed on this
continent. The catalytic agent forcing this break with tradition was
the idea that the will of the people is the foundation of all political
power.
Long before the American Revolution, our political ancestors espoused the belief that government should be derived from the consent of the governed. Emphasizing this principle, Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist that the "fabric of American empire
ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE ....
[T]hat pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority." 5 In the
same connection James Madison also asserted that "the express
authority of the people alone could give due validity to the Constitu4. The leading authority on article V only discusses the process of state legislative ratification in terms of legalities and procedures. These categories concern such matters as whether
the validity of legislative approval depends upon the governor's signature, whether a lieutenant governor can cast a tie-breaking vote in the state senate, and whether a state can require
the holding of a referendum before the legislature acts on a proposal or delay its consideration
of a submitted resolution until there has been a subsequent election of the legislature. See
L. ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUrION 61-78 (1942) [hereinafter cited as ORPIELD].
The only article analyzing the decisional process of a legislature in its constitutional
amending function deals strictly with Congress. See Lacy & Martin, Amending the Constitution: The Bottleneck in the Judiciary Committees, 9 HARv. J. LEois. 666 (1972).
5. Tm FEDERALIST No. 22, at 149 (H. Dawson ed. 1864) (A. Hamilton).
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tionf"I It was further reasoned that if the people created the Constitution, they could also revise it through procedures designed to
preserve and to protect its integrity.
Extrapolating from the notion that constitutional authority rests
upon the sovereignty of the people, the United States divided what
had been classified as legislative action into two categories,
constitution-making and ordinary lawmaking. According to a leading authority on the subject, this distinction means that:
Ordinary laws are enactments and rules for the government of civil
conduct, promulgated by the legislative authority of a state, or deduced from long-established usage. It is an important characteristic
of such laws that they are tentatory, occasional, and in the nature of
temporary expedients. Fundamental laws, on the other hand, in politics, are expressions of the sovereign will in relation to the structure
of the government, the extent and distribution of its powers, the
modes and principles of its operation, and the apparatus of checks
and balances proper to insure its integrity and continued existence.
Fundamental laws are primary, being the commands of the sovereign
establishing the governmental machine, and the most general rules
for its operation. Ordinary laws are secondary, being commands of
the sovereign, having reference to the exigencies of time and place
resulting from the ordinary working of the machine. Fundamental
laws precede ordinary laws in point of time, and embrace the settled
policy of the state. Ordinary laws, are the creatures of the sovereign,
acting through a body of functionaries existing only by virtue of the
fundamental laws and express.

. .

the expedient, or the right viewed

as the expedient, under the varying circumstances of time and place.'
As a result of this differentiation, alterations in the fundamental
law, while not always completely separate from the legislative process, require a special procedure which allows for the maximum
expression of the popular will. This dual concept was a radical departure from the practice used in England where constitutional
changes could be made then, as today, by Parliament, without regard for differences between constitutional and statutory actions.
By classifying a constitution as a unique body of law, a special
6. Id. No. 42, at 306 (J. Madison).
7. J. JAMESON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: ITS HISTORY, POWERS AND MODES OF
PROCEEDING 83 (1873) [hereinafter cited as JAMESON].
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amendatory process thus became an important requisite of the
United States Constitution.
History records, however, that political theorizing was not the sole
motive behind the implementation of an institutionalized amending
formula. Another imposing influence was the practical realization
that, as a general rule, politically organized people only resort to
revolution for political change when there is no other way to accomplish it. Articulating this point at the Philadelphia Constitutional
Convention of 1787, George Mason of Virginia, in urging the inclusion of an amending clause, stated:
The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be
necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular
and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence.'
When the Convention convened, this was the prevailing attitude
among a majority of the delegates who agreed on the necessity of
providing for an amendment procedure. Therefore, rather than
questioning the underlying premise, the discussion over article V
was primarily concerned with establishing its mechanics. The result
was that at a time when in the world at large "it was heresy to
suggest the possibility of change in governments divinely established and ensured,"' the United States formulated a new theory of
constitutional government.
II.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MODE OF STATE LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION

The first mention of legislative participation in the changing of
an organic law is found in the Frame of Government drawn up by
William Penn and his settlers in 1682. This rudimentary amending
clause stipulated:
That no act, law, or ordinance whatsoever, shall at any time hereafter, be made or done by the Governor of this province, his heirs or
assigns, or by the freemen in the provincial council, or the General
Assembly, to alter, change, or diminish the form, or effect, of this
8. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 203 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
9. C. MERRIAM, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND THE UNWRITTEN ATTITUDE

6 (1931).
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charter, or any part, or clause thereof, without the consent of the
Governor, his heirs, or assigns, and six parts of seven of the said
freemen in the provincial council and General Assembly.'"
This article not only marks the first establishment of a formal
amending power in a fundamental law of government, but it also
recognizes the right of the electorate to act through its chosen legislative representatives, who vote upon any proposed alteration in the
constitution in an extraordinary procedure. Subsequent charters of
Pennsylvania, the Frames of 1683 and 1696, also embodied a similar
provision," but none of the other colonial charters at any time provided for their alteration. In fact, the next reference to revision is
found in seven of the state constitutions promulgated during the
period following the Declaration of Independence, and in the
Articles of Confederation, which established our first national government in 1781.
These experiences served as excellent guidelines for the later development of article V, although opinions were divided as to how
constitutional changes could be made without violating the theory
of popular sovereignty. For example, four of the states used the
convention method, which required a special election of delegates, 2
whereas three states vested the amendatory power in their elected
legislatures.' 3 The basic philosophic difference between these modes
concerns what degree of direct participation by voters in the process
is both desirable and feasible. In the first instance delegates would
theoretically stand for election on a declared position regarding
some suggested alteration in a constitution, while in the latter case
it was believed popularly chosen representatives could be trusted to
10. F. THORPE, 5 THE

FEDERAL AND STATE CONSrTTUTONS, COLONIAL CHAPTERS, AND OTHER

3059 (1909).
11. The amending clause of 1682 was revised to read:
That there shall be, at no time, any alteration of any of these laws, without the consent
of the Governor, his heirs, or assigns, and six parts of seven of the freemen, met in
provincial council and General Assembly. Id. at 3063.
12. These states were Georgia, GA. CONST. art. 63 (1777); Massachusetts, MASS. CONST. ch.
VI, art. X (1780); New Hampshire, N.H. CONST. part m1(1783); and Pennsylvania, PA. CONST.
art. 47 (1776).
13. The constitutions of Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina granted the amending
power to the legislatures. DEL. CONST. art. 30 (1776); MD. CONST. art. 59 (1776); S.C. CONST.
art. 44 (1778).
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES
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effect necessary amendments without violating the people's rights.
This disagreement over which procedure most effectively protects
the public interest has aroused debate throughout our history and
has not yet been resolved. 4
At the national level a valuable lesson was also learned since the
inability of amending the Articles of Confederation was a serious
problem contributing largely to their failure. An amendment first
had to be proposed unanimously by the state delegations voting as
states in the Confederation Congress, and then it required ratification by all state legislatures. 5 Three proposals, which by strengthening national powers would have established a more viable government, were defeated by the obstacle of state unanimity for ratification. Twice the vote of one state prevented amendment: Rhode
Island rejected a provision for raising money from import duties 6
and New York vetoed a general revenue plan. 7 A third resolution
relating to national control of commerce in the United States also
8
failed ratification in several states.
Considering the previously mentioned tenets of American constitutional theory, it was inevitable that an effort would be made in
the Convention of 1787 to improve upon national and state experiments with amending formulas. However, the delegates expressed
a sharp division as to what method should be incorporated into the
new Constitution. Advocates of a strong central government favored
giving Congress the exclusive power of proposing amendments. Proponents of states' rights endorsed the idea that a national convention, convened at the request of two-thirds of the state legislatures,
be able to initiate constitutional amendments. The question of how
to amend the Constitution was first introduced at the Convention
when Edmund Randolph presented the Virginia Plan, which recom14. See text accompanying notes 21-40 infra. For a discussion of this disagreement on other
occasions when convention ratification was advocated, see Martin, supra note 2.
15. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII.

16. This proposed amendment, which would have permitted the Confederation government to levy a five percent ad valorem import duty, was defeated in 1782. A. KELY & W.
HARBSON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITTrION: IrS OIGINs AN DEVELOPMENT 110-11 (1970).
17. This proposal, also involving the levying of an import duty, was rejected in 1783. T.
NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION: ITS SOURCES AND APPLIcATiONs 170 (1964).
18. This amendment was designed to end the bickering among the states by giving the
Confederation government control over interstate commerce. It was rejected in 1783. Id.
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mended an amending clause that did not require congressional participation. 9 Yet, neither this suggestion nor the ones favoring initiation of constitutional amendments by the national legislature considered the matter of ratification. This part of the amending process
was evidently disregarded until discussion ensued over how the Con"stitution should be approved. In those debates concerning methods
of ratification, there was a comparison between the merits of the
convention method versus the legislative mode.
To begin with, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut moved for ratification by state legislatures. 0 Colonel George Mason immediately
challenged this recommendation since he believed "a reference of
the plan to the authority of the people [to be] one of the most
important and essential of the Resolutions."" In his opinion the
state legislatures did not have the legitimate power to perform the
ratifying function because:
They are the mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and cannot
be greater than their creators .... Whither then must we resort? To
the people with whom all power remains that has not been given up
in the Constitutions derived from them.Y
Moreover, Mason believed that even if the legislatures were clothed
with the authority to approve the Constitution, they were not the
proper agencies to sanction the organic law of the people inasmuch
as their successors would have an equal right to repudiate their
decision.2 Thus, he asserted, if the proposed national Constitution
were ratified by the state legislatures, it could be assailed by the
aforementioned legal arguments which could prove detrimental to
its efficacy and to its esteem in the minds of the people.
Edmund Randolph next advocated state conventions as a means
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
State

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTON OF 1787, at 121 (M.Farrand ed. 1937).
2 Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
On this point, Mason was concerned that the "National Govt. would stand in each
on the weak and tottering foundation of an Act of Assembly." This dubious status, he

indicated, existed "[i]n some of the States [whose] Govts. were [not] derived from the
clear & undisputed authority of the people." His own state, Virginia, was given as an example

where "[slome of the best & wisest citizens considered the Constitution as established by
an assumed authority." Id. at 88-89.
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of reducing the influence of a few individuals who would oppose any
constitutional change in the benefits they enjoyed under the existing system. He anticipated that the most likely source of opposition
to a new constitution would come from "the local demagogues who
will be degraded by it from the importance they now hold. 2 This
group, Randolph contended, "will spare no efforts to impede that
progress in the popular mind which will be necessary to the adoption
of the plan ....,,2"
Since these men controlled the state legislatures, ratifying conventions were consequently a better way to minimize the power of entrenched political interests. Furthermore, Randolph warned the convention to consider "that some of the States
were averse to any change in their Constitution, and will not take
the requisite steps, unless expressly called upon to refer the question
to the people."2 Therefore, submission of the Constitution to a vote
of the people could also ensure action by the states.
Two other members also favored ratification by conventions.
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina believed that "[c]onventions
were to be preferred as more likely to be composed of the ablest men
in the States."2 Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, on the other
hand, presented a more elaborate defense, contending first that:
In the States, many of the ablest men are excluded from the Legislatures, but may be elected into a Convention. Among these may be
ranked many of the Clergy who are generally friends to good Government. Their services were found to be valuable in the formation &
establishment of the Constitution of Massachts [sic].2
It was also emphasized that members of a specially elected convention would more honestly examine the subject than legislators who
would lose some state prerogatives to the new government. Gorham
was more impressed by the facility accompanying reference to special unicameral assemblies of the people, in comparison to legislative impediments such as bicameralism and the interruptions of "a
variety of little business" designed by opponents to delay "if not to
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 90.
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frustrate altogether the national system."29
Despite the cogency of arguments favoring ratification by popular
conventions, several delegates, chiefly those considered as friends of
states' rights, defended legislative ratification of the Constitution.
In doing so, Elbridge Gerry attacked the use of popular conventions
for the purpose of sanctioning the proposed Constitution, because
he could envision only great confusion resulting from reference to
the people. Not only would the people never be able to agree on
anything, but it was beyond Gerry's comprehension to suppose that
the people would act any differently than their "rulers," for after all,
the rulers "will either conform to, or influence the sense of the
'30
people.
Another defender of ratification by state legislatures, Oliver
Ellsworth, attempted to refute the argument advanced by Mason.
Answering the latter's assertion that state legislatures did not have
the power to ratify a national constitution, Ellsworth remonstrated
that "a new sett [sic] of ideas seemed to have crept in since the
Articles of Confederation were established."' 3' He contended that
the popular convention as an institution derived from the sovereignty of the people existed neither in theory nor in practice at the
time the Articles of Confederation were formed, because the latter's
powers were derived from the state legislatures, which exclusively
could make alterations in the national government. Therefore,
Ellsworth reminded his fellow delegates that the state legislatures
were considered then as being competent to approve national articles; and he added parenthetically, "[tjheir ratification has been
' 32
acquiesced in without complaint. '
29. Regarding article V, the constitutional historian, Charles Warren, believed "the insertion of this alternative mode of ratification by convention had undoubtedly been due to the
same liberal republican spirit which had pervaded the framing of the Constitution in other
respects." Influenced by Gorham's commentary, this conclusion was based on the prevalence
of voting restrictions and preclusions from officeholding in the states. These requirements
applied to state legislatures, but they were not applicable in all states to special conventions
which were elected to represent the sovereignty of the people. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF
THE CONsTrrtroN 677 (1947).
30. 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTON OF 1787, at 90 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
31. Id. at 91.
32. In addition, the gentleman from Connecticut believed Mason's contention that each
succeeding legislature could undo the acts of their predecessors to be unfounded, and he
preemptorily dismissed it in the beginning of his argument with his own contention that
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Another delegate, Rufus King of Massachusetts, agreed with Ellsworth that the state legislatures had the necessary authority to ratify a national constitution; he also believed that "the acquiescence
of the people of America in the Confederation" could be construed
as "equivalent to a formal ratification by the people. 3 3 Nevertheless, he stated a preference for referring the proposed constitution
"to the authority of the people expressly delegated to Conventions,
as the most certain means of obviating all disputes & doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution; as well as the most
likely means of drawing forth the best men in the States to decide
''31 To substantiate
on it.
his reasoning, King used an objection made
in New York against granting certain powers to the Congress under
the Articles of Confederation. Some citizens of this state, he pointed
out, had argued "that such powers as would operate within the
State, could not be reconciled to the State Constitution; and therefore were not grantible [sic] by the Legislative authority. ' 3 Recognizing that there was disagreement with Ellsworth's views, King
decided convention ratification could better eliminate many difficulties such as the "scruples which some members of the State
Legislatures might derive from their oaths to support & maintain
the existing Constitutions."' 38 Hence, this argument, like Gorham's,
was based on expediency, not on popular sovereignty and the theory
of participation by the people in the making of constitutions.
This debate over how the new Constitution should be ratified was
appropriately capped by James Madison. In his opinion the state
legislatures were clearly incapable of ratifying the proposed changes
inasmuch as "[t]hese changes would make essential inroads on the
State Constitutions, and it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine
that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held
its existence. 137 Madison also believed that if all state legislatures
were empowered by their constitutions to pass upon alterations of
the national articles there would be no problem; but since some
"[an act to which the States by their Legislatures, make themselves parties, becomes a
compact from which no one of the parties can recede of itself." Id.
33. Id. at 92.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 92-93.
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state constitutions had not conferred this authority on their legislatures, he concluded it would be necessary to obtain a ratification by
the people. But, according to one commentator, Madison was more
concerned with consulting the people on such matters because
"[hie considered the difference between a system founded on the
Legislature only, and one founded on the people, to be the true
difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. ' 3 This
postulate was the crux of Madison's discourse; characteristically, he
stated it with a well-conceived defense for founding a constitution
on the will of the people.
From the standpoint of "moral obligation" Madison admitted
that a league or treaty was probably as sacrosanct as a constitution,
but he asserted there were two important distinctions which favored
the latter from the standpoint of "political operation." These were:
(1) A law violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting law, might
be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious
one. A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.
(2) The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations in the case of
treaties is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties, frees
the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a union of
people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been
understood to exclude such an interpretation.39
In contradistinction to the legislative mode, ratification by the people in conventions could, therefore, establish the new Constitution
as the supreme law of the land while ascribing the important quality
of permanence to the proposed union. Concluding his address to the
delegates, Madison simply noted that, if for no other reason, expediency favored the convention mode as had been explained by other
delegates."
Although the founding fathers selected the convention alternative
for approval of the Constitution, their debate over ratifying means
manifested some strong sentiments in favor of the legislative
method. Therefore, when article V was being formulated, it is sur38. Id. at 93.
39. Id.
40. See text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
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mised, in the absence of any debates on the matter, that both convention and legislative ratification were probably included as a
compromise which satisfied both sides. The only dissatisfaction
expressed against the ratification section of the amending clause
was by Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who attempted several times
to delete any mention of how many state approvals would complete
ratification." He ostensibly wanted to let future Congresses decide
on a quota according to the circumstances of each case, but inasmuch as he did not include a proviso to this effect in his motions
there may have been an ulterior motive, since merely stating "ratification of the states" could be interpreted as requiring the consent
of all states. Perhaps for this reason the Convention rejected Sherman's logic as it likewise disregarded Elbridge Gerry's complaint
against ratification by conventions in three-fourths of the states."
Aside from these objections no one else manifested concern about
the ratification formula.
When the Constitution was before the states' ratifying conventions, it was opposed principally because there was not a specified
bill of rights. Article V received very little attention, despite its
novelty and its involvement in the famous "gentleman's agreement" to propose, as soon as the First Congress was convened, a bill
of rights to the Constitution as a condition for securing ratification.
Only in Virginia was article V severely criticized, with Patrick
Henry assailing the proponents' contention that "it was a plain,
easy way of getting amendments." Not only did Patrick Henry believe it would prove difficult either to get two-thirds of Congress to
propose amendments or to secure applications for them from twothirds of the states; he was also convinced that ratification by threefourths of the states would be virtually impossible, since a bare
majority in the four smallest states:
[M]ay hinder the adoption of amendments, so that we may fairly
and justly conclude that one twentieth part of the American people
may prevent the removal of the most grievous inconvencies [sic] and
oppression, by refusing to accede to amendments. A trifling minority
may reject the most salutary amendments. 3
41. Id. at 629-31.
42. Id. at 633. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
43. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 49-50 (J. Elloitt ed. 1941).
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Despite their apparent validity, these arguments carried very little
weight among other delegates who were more inclined to accept the
interpretations of James Madison and George Nicholas, the latter
of whom especially believed the provision of alternative modes assured the success of needed constitutional alterations. Yet, Patrick
Henry's analysis has particular merit for legislative ratification as
illustrated by the contemporary problems associated with the approval of the Equal Rights Amendment for Women (ERA). These
implications will be discussed later, but first the history of the legislative mode of ratification needs to be examined.

III.

THE PRECEDENT OF LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION

Following ratification of the Constitution there was an immediate
controversy in the First Congress over which ratifying means should
be used for the proposed Bill of Rights. In this first instance of
adding amendments to the Constitution, the decision to use the
legislative mode was evidently based on a misinterpretation of article V. James Madison, the leading participant in proposing the
resolutions to fulfill the "gentleman's agreement" seems to have
been guided by the "connected modes concept" which inviolably
coupled the modes of proposal and ratification. That is, congressional proposal required legislative ratification; conversely, convention proposal required convention ratification." During this period,
Madison wrote several letters in which he clearly stated his concern
over choosing the most efficacious of these two methods for amending the Constitution. For example, on November 2, 1788, he wrote
G. L. Turbeville that since there is agreement on the need for
amendments "[t]he only question remaining is which of the two
modes provided be most eligible for the discussion and adoption of
them." 5
Even though it is contrary to the stipulation of article V that
Congress has the power to select the ratifying means, the idea that
the mode of proposal automatically determines which alternative of
ratification will be used was unquestionably accepted in at least
44. For a detailed explanation of this concept, see Martin, Madison'sPrecedentof Legislative Ratification for ConstitutionalAmendments, 109 PROC. OF THE Am. PHILos. Soc'y 47-52
(1965).
45. 1 THE WRrTNGS OF JAMES MADISON 298 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910).
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some quarters during the early years under the Constitution. The
most explicit reference to the concept is found in the debates of the
Eighth Congress with regard to the twelfth amendment. There, Senator Plumer of New Hampshire noted that the Constitution provided only two methods for its amendment-convention and legislative. As to the convention method, Plumer pointed out that Congress, after receiving the petitions of two-thirds of the states, must
call a national convention to propose amendments, which for ratification are "not to be sent either to the State legislatures who requested the Convention, not to Congress who called it; but to a
Convention chosen by the people in each State."46 Plumer's division
of the convention mode into the stages of proposal and ratification
is elucidated by his additional commentary that "[t]hese State
conventions will have the sole and exclusive power of approving or
rejecting the amendments. ' 47 Moreover, it was asserted that
"[t]hese two kinds of Conventions have each a check upon the
other-each have particular authority delegated to them." 8 The
other method was indicated to be that "if two-thirds of both houses
of Congress deem it necessary to propose amendments, and threefourths of the State Legislatures ratify them, they are valid. ' 49
Senator Plumer was -not alone in advocating the theory of connected modes, for Senator Tracy of Connecticut observed:
Two-thirds of both Houses of Congress shall deem it necessary to
propose amendments, and three-fourths of the State Legislatures
shall ratify such amendments, before they acquire validity. I speak
now sir, of the mode which has always been, and probably will be put
in practice to obtain amendments. The other constitutional mode is
equally guarded as to numbers. ....
1o
Referring to the framing of the Constitution, Tracy remarked that
"[ilt was well known to the Convention that amendments, if rec46. WILLIAM PLUMER'S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 1803-

1807, at 46-47 (E. Brown ed. 1932). While reporting its essence, the official record of debates
has an incomplete version of Plumer's speech. 15 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 153 (1803).
47. 15 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 153 (1803).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 175.
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ommended or proposed by Congress, would have an imposing influence with the State Legislatures. ' 51 There is no evidence indicating,
however, that the concept of "connected modes" existed in the Philadelphia Convention.
The two Senators were not alone in espousing this conception of
article V, for Representative Thatcher of Massachusetts commented:
The Constitution has ... made each House of Congress and the
State Legislatures a check upon each other; else why are two-thirds
of both Houses of Congress; and Legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States required by the Constitution to concur in an amendment.2
Another argument over whether the resolution under consideration should read "which when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the several States" or "which when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the said States" was ended by Representative Thomas of New York, who did not believe it necessary to mention the mode of ratification in the resolution submitting an amendment.5 3 In his opinion the mere fact that Congress proposed an
amendment meant that it would have to be ratified by the legislatures of the states.54
Thereafter the record is silent on the point of "connected modes,"
but it is evident that this concept affected the amending process for
some time, as subsequent amendments proposed by Congress called
for legislative ratification, thereby establishing a precedent not broken until December 12, 1860. During this period, 783 amendments
were proposed with 482 of them to be ratified by state legislatures.
The remainder did not mention ratification, but there is no reason
to suppose that if these resolutions had been seriously considered,
the prescribed ratification would not have been by state legislatures.
IV.

STATE

PROCEDURES FOR LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION

Because only the legislative alternative was used until the twenty51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 176.
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id.
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first amendment was proposed by Congress in 1933, the states had
a number of opportunities to develop procedures for processing proposed federal constitutional amendments. In the absence of any
specifications in article V, however, the states were not always consistent in the manner in which they considered resolutions, but
gradually a relatively standard procedure evolved in the legislatures
across the nation.
A.

The Committee Stage

Following the Congressional example, the states have generally
developed the same precedent of referring proposed amendments to
committees for study before a vote is taken in each house. In 1972 a
questionnaire survey55 conducted through the Legislative Reference
Service 6 or the equivalent in each state,57 found that both houses
of 46 legislatures usually refer proposed amendments to committee
for consideration before any floor action is taken. In none of these
states, however, is participation in the amending function controlled by statutory authority, which means that states can by-pass
committee deliberation in favor of floor decision-making. This happened, for example, in the case of the twenty-fourth amendment
when both chambers of the Rhode Island legislature immediately
brought the resolution to the floor for approval by unanimous consent. 5
Of the remaining four states Connecticut has a Joint Committee
on Constitutional Amendments and Massachusetts has a Joint Judiciary Committee, both of which handle the preliminary discussion
of federal resolutions before reporting recommendations to their respective chambers for a final vote. Only in Arizona is a proposal
taken up directly on the floor without first going through the committee process, but Nebraska has traditionally followed the same
55. This approach was used because the procedures employed by the state legislatures have
not been previously studied.
56. Many states provide bill-drafting assistance and other forms of legislative research
through an established bureau. See C. ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 347 (1972).
57. In some states there is a legislative council which consists of selected legislators who
study matters to be considered in the next session. It is assisted by a professional staff which
also performs the functions of a legislative reference service. Id.
58. Reported in the questionnaire response by the Joint Committee on Legislative Affairs
for Rhode Island on July 16, 1972.

19751

STATE LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION

practice even though consideration by the Governmental and Military Affairs Committee is permissible under its legislative rules.
While in theory the committee system guarantees a thorough investigation of alterations in the Constitution, experience with this
procedure indicates that it is susceptible to manipulation by a small
minority who oppose a particular change in the Constitution. This
problem was discerned in the First Congress by Representative
Thomas Tucker of South Carolina, who predicted that legislative
ratification could be far more difficult than anyone had anticipated.
Comparing the modes of ratification, Tucker perceived that as slow
and uncertain as the convention method might be, ratification by
state legislatures "is still worse" because "[tihe Legislatures of all
the States consist of two independent, distinct bodies; the amendment must be adopted by three-fourths of such Legislatures; that
is to say, they must meet the approbation of the majority of each of
eighteen deliberative assemblies.""
The problem foreseen by Tucker soon occurred in the case of the
following proposition:
If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or
retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall, without the consent of
Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office, or emolument of any kind whatever from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign
power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States,
and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under
them or either of them.60
The adoption of this amendment lacked only the vote of one state.
It was rejected on March 12, 1811, by the New York Senate, thereby
ending its chances in that state.6 In South Carolina, though, it was
approved by the Senate on November 28, 1811, but consideration
was postponed by the lower house on December 21, 1811.62 The
resolution was reported unfavorably from committee in the next
session of the legislature, and the South Carolina lower house de59.

1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 716 (1789).
60. 22 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 530 (1810).
61. H. AMES, PROPOsED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrTED STATES DURiNG
THE FIRST CENTURY OF rrs HISTORY 329 (1897) [hereinafter cited as AMEs].
62. Id.
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cided not to consider it further on December 7, 1813.3 In the meantime it was generally supposed in Congress, as a result of the South
Carolina Senate's affirmative vote, that the amendment had been
ratified by the requisite number of twelve states, and in the official
edition of the Constitution of the United States, printed for the use
of the Fifteenth Congress, the Title of Nobility resolution appears
as the thirteenth amendment. 4 Upon being informed of this mistake, Congress corrected the error, but the general public continued
to think that the amendment had been adopted. Consequently, one
commentator has discovered that for over a third of a century the
presumed addition was included in privately prepared editions of
65

the Constitution and in history texts.

Tucker's evaluation of the complications inherent in the gauntlet
presented by legislative ratification was most recently reiterated in
1969 when the House of Representatives was debating its resolution
to have the President and Vice-President elected directly by the
people. Urging the use of the convention mode, Congressman Robert
McClory of Illinois asserted that it promised a greater probability
of success because national polls reported that 80 or 81 percent of
the people supported the popular vote plan while estimates of state
legislative opposition ranged somewhere between 10 to 15 states.6
On this score it was pointed out that an amendment only has to be
confirmed by 38 state ratifying conventions, whereas achieving concurrence can be much more difficult via the legislative mode because a proposal is considered by 99 decision-making bodies. 7 Anticipating that the less populous states would naturally be opposed
to the amendment since the direct election plan would logically
result in presidential candidates concentrating their campaigns on
metropolitan areas, a few other farsighted members also believed
that the convention alternative should be used, but the motion was
easily defeated on the grounds that history had proven the success
of the legislative method. 8 Obviously, this precedent is very
strongly established in Congress.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 189.
For a report of this analysis, see 115 CONG. REc. 25973 (1969).
Nebraska has a unicameral legislature.

68. 115

CONG. REC.

25977 (1969).
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Another intricacy of legislative ratification, that of committee
resistance, is illustrated by the experience of the ERA. During the
three years it has been before the states, this resolution has encountered stiff opposition in several legislative committees, and final
approval probably depends upon clearing this obstacle. For example, in Virginia the ERA has been "pigeonholed" for two consecutive
years (1973-74) by the House of Delegates' Privileges and Election
Committee.5 .' Supporters of the amendment contend that there
have been enough votes on the floor for ratification, but their efforts
to discharge the amendment from the committee have failed. This
controversy has even involved the Virginia Attorney General, whose
office prepared a memorandum used by the committee in making
its decision not to report the proposal. According to this opinion,
ratification might mean the end of separate rest rooms for men and
women, both sexes drafted into the military services and girls in the
cadet corps at the Virginia Military Institute.
The Virginia episode demonstrates how a minority of legislators
can preclude an entire state legislature from acting on a matter of
national responsibility. In this instance, the votes of only 12 of the
20 committee members were needed to prevent further consideration. Since 46 of the states usually begin the process of deliberation
at the committee level, there is actually a total of 184 bodies in these
states participating in the decision-making permitted by article V
of the Constitution. Adding to this number the joint committee
procedures of Connecticut and Massachusetts and the floor action
policy of Arizona and Nebraska, the final total of decisional units
concerned with ratification is 193, a much greater figure than the
enumerations of Representatives Tucker 9 and McClory. 0 Herein
lies a previously undiscussed aspect of the legislative mode which,
on one hand, has the advantage of checking ill-conceived constitutional changes by providing a great deal of discussion on any proposal, but on the other hand, has the disadvantage of minority
obstruction to an alteration widely desired by the American public.
B.

ConstitutionalLobbying
The diffusion of amendment decision-making in many state legis-

68.1. During the 1975 session of the General Assembly the Senate Privileges and Election
Committee initially reported the bill out to the Senate floor. The entire Senate voted, by a
small margin, to recommit the bill to the Committee, which, by a vote of 8 to 7, decided not
to report the ERA back to the Senate floor.
69. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
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latures furnishes ample opportunity for the application of external
organizational pressure either to pass or to reject a proposed amendment. Although this phenomenon of American politics has affected
the amending process throughout this century, it has received very
little publicity. One of the first accounts explaining how a legislature may be influenced in the ratifying process was published in
1970 on the fiftieth anniversary of the nineteenth amendment's
adoption, when a national magazine featured the recollections of
Harry T. Burn, who cast the tie-breaking vote for ratification in the
Tennessee House of Representatives on August 18, 1920.71 Tennessee
was the last chance for ratification before state legislative sessions
would be held again two years later. Therefore, its legislature was
called into special session, at which time a bitter struggle began
between the suffragettes and their opposition, with the legislators
being subjected to all of the tactics used by lobbyists.
A more recent study has disclosed how the powerful national
lobby, Common Cause, campaigned successfully for the ratification
of the twenty-sixth amendment, which lowered the voting age to
eighteen years. 2 This organization researched each state where the
resolution was expected to face stiff opposition for the purpose of
mapping a strategy to achieve ratification. Pressure was brought to
bear on legislatures through mailings from the general public, advertising on the news media, personal persuasion and so forth. The
efficacy of these efforts was evidenced by the fastest time for ratification on record and by the subsequent use of the same techniques
by both sides in the current controversy over ratifying the ERA.
The advent of constitutional lobbying in the state legislative ratifying process has led to some efforts to control it. Anticipating the
possibility of state legislatures being pressured by organized groups
into accepting unpopular amendments, Ohio amended its constitution in 1918 to require a referendum following its legislature's decision to ratify or to reject a federal constitutional change. After the
Ohio legislature approved the Prohibition Resolution, a state citizen
petitioned for an injunction to prevent the holding of a referendum
71. Cahn, The Man Whose Vote Gave Women the Vote, 34 LooK, Aug. 25, 1970, at 60.
72. A. Yowell, Ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, (1970) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University).
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by claiming that such action was an unconstitutional use of state
funds. When the Supreme Court reviewed the claim in Hawke v.
Smith,73 it ruled, first, that under the Constitution, Congress has
the plenary power to select the mode of ratification to be used by
the states. 74 Second, the Court emphasized that "ratification by a
state of a constitutional amendment is not an act of legislation
within the proper sense of the word. '75 Instead, it was pointed out
that ratification "is but the expression of the assent of the State to
a proposed amendment."7 The Court found the basis for separating
the functions of state legislatures in the following interpretation:
It is true that the power to legislate in the enactment of the laws
of a State is derived from the people of the State. But the power to
ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its
source in the Federal Constitution. The act of ratification by the
State derives its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the
State and its people have alike assented.77
It was further believed that the prevalence of this view in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, coupled with the desire to avoid conflicting action in the states, explains why Congress was wisely given
78
exclusive control over selecting the means of ratification.
Several years after striking the requirement of a referendum, the
Supreme Court, in Leser v. Garnett,79 ruled against the stipulation
contained in several state constitutions which required that following the submission of an amendment to the states, the regularly
scheduled legislative election must be held before the legislature
could take any action on it. In this way the voters would have an
opportunity to express their opinion about a proposal for which
there was public concern. Reiterating the essence of its decision in
Hawke v. Smith, the Court again precluded any state-prescribed
73. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
74. Id. at 227.
75. Id. at 229.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 230.
78. Despite the finality of the ruling in Hawke v. Smith, it was repeated recently with
regard to a similar provision in the Florida Constitution. See Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F.

Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
79. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
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alterations to article V's ratifying modes."0 Thus, the only alternative available to the state legislatures for sampling public opinion
on a proposed federal constitutional amendment is a public hearing
conducted during the committee stage of the ratifying process. At
present only Connecticut requires the holding of a public hearing,
but Nebraska explicitly has this prerogative if it chooses to refer a
resolution to committee. While they do not so specify in their rules
and regulations, other states at times use the device of a public
hearing, which is obviously constitutionally permissible inasmuch
as it is a long-standing practice of legislatures to conduct their
business in this manner. It is clear from Supreme Court rulings,
however, that any other reform designed to secure more public participation in the legislative method of ratification will have to be
initiated by a constitutional amendment.
C.

Voting

Since article V is silent on the matter, the states have set their
own policies concerning what percentage of the membership in each
legislative chamber is necessary to approve a proposed resolution.
In the past some of the states have required a majority of two-thirds
to correspond with the congressional quota."1 However, the recent
survey of 'state procedures 2 reports that today only the Washington
legislature and the Kansas lower house use the two-thirds rule. This
means, of course, that from a numerical standpoint it is not as
difficult to ratify an amendment before a state legislature as it is to
propose it in Congress, a fact which may explain why only five
rather obscure resolutions have failed of ratification. 3
In the absence of a constitutional statement on the subject, the
Supreme Court has ruled in Coleman v. Miller, that whereas questions involving ratification voting procedures and quotas are political in nature, they must be answered by the elected legislature, not
the judiciary.84 Thus, the upper house of a state legislature was
allowed to decide whether a lieutenant governor who presided over
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 137.
See AmEs, supra note 61, at 297.
Supra note 55.
Supra note 3.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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that chamber could cast the tie-breaking vote on the Child Labor
Amendment. 5 A similar controversy has recently developed over the
ratification of the ERA. During the summer of 1974, a majority of
the Illinois Senate approved the ERA, but the president of that
body ruled that a two-thirds vote was needed.8 1 Supporters of the
proposed amendment are planning an appeal to a three-judge federal court" but, following the Coleman decision, it seems unlikely
that the special court will answer such a question.
D. Reporting Procedure
Once a state legislature has voted on a proposed amendment, the
decision is communicated to the governor who merely transmits the
result to the Administrator of General Services Administration who
keeps the official record of ratifications and rejections. A governor
does not have the power either to sign or to veto the legislature's
decision. 81 Likewise, the General Services Administrator only reports the count of states which have completed their actions. He
does not have the authority to rule on the validity of ratifications
or rejections or, in the instance of recent events, rescissions. The
answers to these questions must be found in Congress.
V.

RESCISSION OF RATIFICATION

As previously noted, Nebraska and Tennessee have rescinded
their ratifications of the ERA, and several other states have contemplated the same course of action.89 If enough of the remaining states
ratify the proposed amendment, the matter will become moot, but
there will remain the issue of whether a state can constitutionally
reconsider its decision. In Coleman v. Miller, the Supreme Court
held that a state can later ratify an amendment after it has been
previously rejected by the legislature," ° but for an answer to the
question of rescission it is necessary to look elsewhere.
85. Id. at 438.
86. Washington Post, July 14, 1974, at A2, col. 1.

87. Id.
88. According to an early case, neither the President nor a state governor can constitutionally participate in the amending process because it is a constituent function to be performed
by the elected representatives of the people in either the convention or legislature. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798).
89. 32 CONG. Q. 175 (1974).
90. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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The History of Rescission

The first occurrence of a state withdrawing its approval involved
the fourteenth amendment. New Jersey and Ohio rescinded their
ratifications before three-fourths of the states had given their consent, and both states justified their actions on the grounds that since
the amendment had not been incorporated into the Constitution, a
state still had the prerogative of reconsidering its decision." Congress, disagreeing with this contention, ordered that the New Jersey
and Ohio ratifications be counted as official and irrevocable.12 Before any appeal could be taken to court, enough states accepted the
amendment to end all opportunity for litigation. Later, Oregon
withdrew its consent to the fifteenth amendment 3 while Tennessee
reached a similar decision on the nineteenth amendment, 4 but in
both cases the action was meaningless as the amendments had already been adopted by three-fourths of the other states when the
rescissions were made.
In recent years the states have competed for the honor of being
the 38th state to ratify an amendment, and this development has
led to a humorous incident concerning article V. In the case of the
twenty-fifth amendment North Dakota, on February 10, 1967, ratified the proposal," only to discover that it was the 37th and not the
38th state to do so. Immediately North Dakota withdrew its consent
to await another state's ratification, but in the meantime Minnesota, thinking it would be the 38th, approved the amendment," as
did Nevada within a short time. 7 North Dakota's rescission was
evidently accepted because Minnesota and Nevada were declared
respectively to be the 37th and 38th states to ratify the twenty-fifth
91. This episode is reviewed in AMES, supra note 61, at 299.
92. The only reason given by Congress for its decision was that since article V mentions
only ratification and does not refer to rejection, the New Jersey and Ohio resolutions were
irregular and therefore invalid. 15 Stat. 708 (1868).
93. Oregon withdrew its ratification on October 15, 1868, whereas the fourteenth amendment was officially proclaimed ratified on July 28, 1868. Id.
94. C. TANSILL, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIrrD STATES: 18891926, S. Doc. No. 93, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 281 (1926).
95. Reported in the questionnaire response of the North Dakota Legislative Council. See
note 55 supra.
96. This ratification is recorded for February 10, 1967. S. REP. No. 91-1367, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1970).
97. Id.
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amendment.18 Obviously, this event does not constitute a solid precedent for judging later cases. 9 However, the reaction of Congress
to the New Jersey and Ohio rescissions must be considered as a valid
precedent.' ° In addition, there is a solid theoretical justification for
denying a state the right to withdraw its ratification.
B.

The Theory of Nonrescission

It has been noted earlier in this article that the separation of
fundamental law from ordinary statutory law was essential in developing the concept of constitutional amendment.'0 ' Accordingly, a
special procedure is required to make a change in the Constitution
because it is the statement of fundamental law. The distinction
between fundamental and ordinary law was incorporated in article
V by demanding a vote of two-thirds of the members of both houses
of Congress for the proposal of amendments to the Constitution, a
greater majority than is demanded for the passage of ordinary legislation.' 2 In a like manner the greater majorities required for the
calling of a national convention to propose amendments and for the
ratification of resolutions by the states are based on the theory that
issues concerning fundamental law are of a higher order than matters involving ordinary law. This difference was emphasized by the
Supreme Court in Hawke v. Smith, when it delineated the lawmaking function of a state legislature from its capacity to ratify
98. Id.
99. According to the official report of ratification for the twenty-fifth amendment, the
National Archives did not receive any information from North Dakota. If its rescission was
received, certainly no decision was made on its validity. A probable explanation for what
happened is that both of North Dakota's actions were disregarded since the requisite number
of ratifications also occurred on the same day, thereby mooting the issue. At any rate, there
is no evidence of a decision which establishes a solid precedent. Id.
100. In his analysis Orfield does not believe that this is a strong precedent "particularly
since the act of Congress was passed in a period of unrest and since the court had had no
opportunity to pass on its validity." ORmin, supra note 4, at 20. In Coleman v. Miller,
however, the Supreme Court confirmed the congressional precedent by stating that:
Thus the political departments of the Government dealt with the effect both of
previous rejection and of attempted withdrawal and determined that both were ineffectual in the presence of an actual ratification. . . . This decision by the political departments of the Government as to the validity of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been accepted. 307 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1939).
101. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
102. The Constitution provides that a majority of each house "shall constitute a Quorum
to do Business." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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proposed constitutional amendments.0 3 In approving an alteration
to the Constitution a state legislature acts on behalf of the sovereign
people who, in theory, have the sole power to make and change the
fundamental law of a nation." 4
While there was disagreement in the Philadelphia Convention
over which mode was most appropriate for ratifying the Constitution, 0 5 there was no objection0 0 to including the legislative
method alongside the convention method as an equally valid alternative. ' Under the legislative method, two-thirds of both houses of
Congress can propose amendments and three-fourths of the state
legislatures can ratify the amendments. Therefore, when a state
legislature acts upon a proposed federal constitutional amendment,
it does so in the special capacity of the peoples' representative in a
process which was created by the founding fathers to make the
Constitution an enduring, viable body of fundamental law.' 8
With regard to the ratification of an amendment, the theory separating fundamental and ordinary law holds that once a state has
agreed to an amendment the decision cannot later be rescinded, but
conversely, a state can later accept an alteration it has previously
103. See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
104. On this point the Maine Supreme Court has ruled that:
[Tihe state Legislature in ratifying the amendment, as Congress in proposing it, is
not, strictly speaking, acting in the discharge of legislative duties and functions as a
law making body, but is acting in behalf of and as representatives of the people as a
ratifying body under the power expressly conferred upon it by Article V. The people
through their [national] Constitution might have clothed the [state] Senate alone,
or the [state] House alone, or the Governor's Council, or the Governor, with the power
of ratification, or might have reserved that power to themselves to be exercised by
popular vote. But they did not. In re Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 544, 546-47, 107
A. 673, 674 (1919).
105. There was no discussion of the modes, as the question over which was the most
theoretically correct method for promulgating a new constitution had evidently been resolved
in favor of the Convention, while for proposing and ratifying amendments to a constitution
either the convention or the legislative mode was considered satisfactory. See text accompanying notes 20-40 supra.
106. The vote of the states on article V was nine to one. The New Hampshire delegation
was divided, and New York did not vote. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 631 (M. Farrand ed. 1923).
107. The theory that both the convention and legislative method are equally representative
of the people in amending state constitutions has always prevailed among the states, all of
which today authorize the use of either mode. BOOK OF THE STATES 4 (1974).
108. See notes 103 and 104 supra.
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rejected." 9 This concept was first invoked in 1865 when the Kentucky legislature rejected the thirteenth amendment. When the resolution of rejection was submitted to the Governor, he returned it
to the legislature with the following message:
When ratified by the legislatures of the several States, the question
will be finally withdrawn, and not before. Until ratified, it will remain
an open question for the ratification of the legislatures of the several
States. When ratified by the legislature of a State, it will be final as
to such State; and, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths
of the several States, will be final as to all. Nothing but ratification
forecloses the right of action. When ratified, all power is expended.
Until ratified, the right to ratify remains."'
The rationale supporting this concept is provided by the doctrine
of political or social compact."' Although this idea is a hypothesis
for explaining the origin of a constitution, it also serves the purpose
of establishing a basis in fundamental law for relationships between
individuals, between citizens and their governments and between
the components of a federal system such as the United States. Since
the Constitution was ratified by the authority of the states, it is
considered in theory to be a compact among equal states. According
109. In Coleman v. Miller the Supreme Court deferred to the judgment of the political
branches of the government in accepting this thesis. It was thus noted that:
The argument in support of that view is that Article V says nothing of rejection but
speaks only of ratification and provides that a proposed amendment shall be valid as
part of the Constitution when ratified by three fourths of the States; that the power
to ratify is thus conferred upon the State by the Constitution and as a ratifying power,
persists despite a previous rejection. 307 U.S. 433, 447 (1939).
110. Message of Governor Bramlette of March 1, 1865, to the Kentucky Legislature. Cited
in JAMESON, supra note 7, at 520. According to Jameson, this interpretation of article V has a
great deal of historical legitimacy. In his opinion the evidence indicates that:
It could hardly have been unintentional, that the contingency of a rejection of the
proposed amendment by one or more States was left unprovided for; and it would seem
a stretch of power to interpolate into that article a provision, that if rejected by one
legislature or by three fourths of even all of the legislatures, such action should be
taken to be definitive. On the contrary, it is reasonable to suppose the convention
intended to give to dissenting legislatures an opportunity to recede from an application
of their negative which circumstances might show to be hasty and-disastrous. Id. at
520-21.
111. This doctrine means that a government is based on the consent of the governed, who
have agreed through the promulgation of a contract to accept certain duties and responsibilities in return for the government's guarantee of individual rights. JAMESON, supra note 7, at
68.
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to this concept, a state can later accept an alteration it has previously rejected because a rejection has not changed the governmental system or the conditions under which it functions. On the other
hand, it is not possible for a state to later reject an alteration it has
accepted without affecting those states which have agreed to make
the proposed change. Once a state has agreed to a change in the
fundamental law it can reverse its decision only by securing the
consent of the requisite number of states in the amending process,
in the same manner that prohibition was repealed by the twentyfirst amendment. Article V, then, provides the mechanism for preserving the sanctity of agreements in fundamental law, and a state
cannot legitimately revoke its ratification of an amendment to the
fundamental law anymore than it can abrogate its consent to the
formation of the American Union in the original ratifying conven11 2
tions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

After analyzing all of the evidence, it is apparent that the mode
of state legislative ratification involves more than the mere approval
of a proposed federal constitutional amendment. It is a forum for
constitutional discussion, an arena for competing political forces
and conflicting ideologies and a fortress for defending the constitutional system. In short it is a distinctive process within the total
amending process. Over the years the legislative mode has served
the nation well, and as more is learned about the intricacies of its
operations, some reforms will probably be made to improve its effectiveness.
112. The tenet that a state cannot revoke its consent to the formation of the American
union was expressed in the Philadelphia Convention. See note 32 supra. The Supreme Court
endorsed this thesis in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
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